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INTRODUCTION
The western wave was all a-flame,
The day was well nigh done!
Almost upon the western wave
Rested the broad bright sun;
When that strange shape drove suddenly
Betwixt us and the sun.
- Samuel Taylor Coleridge
1
Imagine yourself at midnight, drafting an amendment to a complex
set of loan documents. The client, of course, wants an immediate
turnaround. You turn to your firm's precedent files. However, having
recently encountered literature touting the manifest benefits of the
"plain English ' 2 approach to contract drafting, you also open a newly-
published drafting style guide. You quickly find yourself awash on the
"western wave" of transactional practice-making complex and legally
determinative language choices for a high paying client, balancing
drafting scholars' urgings to purge "archaisms" 3 in the contract text with
the desire to retain the traditional terms included in the firm's preferred
forms.
Similar to the function of the figure of speech "western wave" in
the Coleridge poem, where it represents the broader concept of the
ocean, certain traditional "terms of art"4 in contract forms operate as
1. 1 SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, in THE POETICAL
WORKS OF SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE 165 (T. Ashe ed., George Bell & Sons, London
1890) (1834).
2. BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH 109 (Univ. of Chi. Free
Press 2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter GARNER, PLAIN ENGLISH]. Note that scholars have various
ways of referring to the plain language movement in the drafting context, including
"common English," GEORGE W. KUNEY, THE ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT DRAFTING: WITH
QUESTIONS AND CLAUSES FOR CONSIDERATION 47 (3d ed. 2011) and "standard English."
KENNETH A. ADAMS, A MANUAL OF STYLE FOR CONTRACT DRAFTING §§ 1.22, 1.28-.29
(ABA Bus. Law Section 3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE] (noting a
distinction from the "plain English" movement, focused primarily on consumer contracts, so
as not to suggest a "dumbing down" of complex commercial contract language, rather the
use of "straightforward alternatives" in lieu of "terms of art").
3. ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2 §§1.4-.6.
4. The phrase "term of art" as used in this Article refers to a phrase having
"specialized doctrinal meaning" and serving as "shorthand for legal concepts." ADAMS,
MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2, § 1.7. Note that "terms of art" are considered conceptually
distinct from the concept of "boilerplate," which encompasses "standard provisions inserted
at the end of almost every transactional document." KUNEY, supra note 2, at 153. Rather,
"terms of art" encompass traditionally expressed "specialized terminology," or "standard
provisions" specifically chosen by drafters to satisfy a particular purpose, including terms
Say the Magic Word
"artful deviations from the ordinary mode of speaking or writing."5
Such phrases, sometimes derogatorily referred to as "magic words,"6
can serve as elegant shorthand for more complex legal concepts.
Classical rhetoricians from Quintilian to Aristotle have recognized that
these figures of speech function as a vital "means of lending credibility"
and "clearness" to written work.7 This article proposes that these classic
analytical tools can be applied not only to narrative writing, but also to
the drafting of complex modern commercial contracts.
Nonetheless, a few modern drafting scholars have recently begun
to argue for a near-wholesale elimination of terms of art in favor of
"plain English." 8 This urge to purge traditional language has its origins
in the plain language movement. Although that movement was
originally focused on public and consumer documents, some drafting
scholars have extended it to argue for the use of terms easily understood
by non-legal readers, even in complex contracts between sophisticated
parties.'
The dichotomy between plain language and the more traditional
text included in forms preferred by senior attorneys can leave the
drafter, particularly the inexperienced drafter, unsure when it may be
acceptable to deviate from time-tested language in favor of a more
modern approach. As a result, some senior transactional attorneys
suggest that traditional text tends to be "preserved" in complex
contracts "because an inexperienced drafter will not be sure why it is
there or whether taking it out would help or hurt the document." 10
Further, at least one modern drafting scholar asserts that inertia is the
like "hypothecate," "coupled with an interest," and "time is of the essence." ADAMS,
MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2, §§ 1.7-2.1.
5. EDWARD P. J. CORBETT & ROBERT J. CONNORS, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE
MODERN STUDENT 379 (Oxford Univ. Press 4th ed. 1999).
6. ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2, §§ 1.28-.29. Adams describes
"archaisms, magic words, and terms of art" as phrases of "traditional contract prose" which
differ from "standard English-the English used by educated native English speakers," the
use of which he suggests should be the "aim" of all drafters. Id § 1.28. Adams distinguishes
this "standard English" from "plain English," which he describes as "the simplified
language required of consumer contracts." Id. § 1.29. However, as will be described in
Section I.B infra, the plain language movement has influenced current drafting scholarship's
push toward the redrafting of traditional terms.
7. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 5, at 377-78.
8. KuNEY, supra note 2, at 18.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 38-77. Complex commercial contracts have
been chosen as the basis for the analysis in this article, as the public policy considerations
associated with plain language for consumer contracts are less applicable.
10. MiTU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE 3/2 MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE
AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 10 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2013) (quoting Lee C.
Buchheit of the firm Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton).
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dispositive factor in retaining traditional terms of art."
However, this Article will prove that the motives of contract
drafters in retaining traditional terms of art often go beyond simple
inertia. Particularly, the application of pentadic rhetorical criticism 2 to
a particular contract proves that the decision whether to redraft terms of
art into plain language in complex contracts is not the straightforward
matter of style some modem drafting scholars may make it seem.'3
Kenneth Burke's method of pentadic rhetorical criticism uses a five-
pronged analysis of a particular piece of writing, which enables the
critic to determine what the writers of the document "are doing and why
they are doing it[.]"' 4
This determination of the rhetorical and philosophical
underpinnings of the choice to retain particular terms of art provides
insight into the behaviors of drafters and justifications for the retention
of traditional terms of art. The application of rhetorical criticism to
contract drafting choices will demonstrate that retention of traditional
terms of art in complex contracts has a very distinct and important
motivation beyond the pure scrivener's role, that of advocacy on behalf
of the client. In applying Burke's pentad, it becomes clear that the act of
drafting a contract in a way that favors a client, and predisposes the
potential end-user of the contract to come to a similarly favorable
interpretation, can actively underlie a drafter's decision to retain a
traditional term of art.
This Article will proceed in four parts. The first section will
provide background on the debate between time-tested terms of art and
plain language in contract drafting. The second section will specifically
identify the "time is of the essence" clause as a helpful term of art to
understand drafters' rhetorical choices. The third section will illuminate
how pentadic rhetorical criticism applies to the field of contract
drafting. Finally, the fourth section will apply rhetorical criticism to
argue that traditional, tested terms of art are often retained by drafters
based on a specific motivation and should not be jettisoned when
necessary for effective advocacy.
11. ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2, § 1.5.
12. See KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTVES xv (Univ. of Cal. Press Cal. ed.
1969) [hereinafter BURKE, GRAMMAR].
13. See ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2, § 1.22; KUNEY, supra note 2.
14. BURKE, GRAMMAR, supra note 12, at xv.
[Vol. 65:451
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I. THE DRAFTER'S DEBATE: PLAIN LANGUAGE VS. TIME-TESTED TERMS
[The lawyers] described contract terms as 'magic incantations' and
'talismans,' [and] referred to contract drafting as a 'ritual.'
-Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott 15
The debate between terms of art and plain English in the context of
contract drafting is a relatively modem one. The basis for this
modernity may rest on the fact that formal American legal education in
drafting style has only become widespread in the past twenty years. 16
While experiments in teaching contract drafting occurred as early as
1965,' 7 the earliest collection of data concerning the number of law
schools offering dedicated courses in contract or transactional drafting
dates back only to 1992, at which time only thirty-one American law
schools provided such course offerings. 18 By 2010, that number had
increased 210% to 122 law schools.' 9
Thus, more and more drafters are currently leaving law school
armed with a foundation in modem drafting style, which due to the
influence of the plain language movement, advocates for the removal or
redrafting of traditional contract terms. These young attorneys enter a
workforce dominated by seasoned practitioners who often favor a more
traditional approach, leaving the inexperienced attorneys struggling to
determine whether the redrafting of traditional terms is appropriate.
Valuable insight into this dilemma can be gained by the application
of modem rhetorical criticism to sophisticated contracts. Rhetorical
analysis can assist in determining the possible motives of drafters in
retaining traditional terms of art. In order to undertake a rhetorical
analysis, the history of contract drafting scholarship and underpinning
theories concerning the "sticky" nature of these phrases must first be
explored. Also, traditional notions concerning the authorship and
literary function of contracts must be unpacked in order to understand
the backdrop against which modem drafters of sophisticated contracts
make language choices. These modes of analyzing contracts help to
explain some of the potential benefits of retaining traditional terms, and
15. GULATI & ScoTr, supra note 10, at 109.
16. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR, A SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA: 2002-2010 78 (Catherine L. Carpenter et
al. eds., 2012).
17. REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 3 (Little, Brown &
Co. 3d prtg. 1965).
18. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 78.
19. Id.
2015] 455
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also influence drafter motives.
A. Review of Early Drafting Scholarship
Little formal scholarship exists discussing the debate between the
use of traditional terms of art and modem contract drafting styles, likely
based on the fact that the uptick in formal education on drafting style
has only occurred in the recent past.20 Even as recently as 2012, drafting
scholars have continued to bemoan the fact that contract drafting skills
have been "neglected in ... research.",21 To bridge this gap in the
scholarship, the development of modem drafting style over time and
how it has influenced modem drafting scholars' and practitioners' views
on whether to retain traditional terms must be explored.
One of the earliest guidebooks on contract drafting style, Reed
Dickerson's The Fundamentals of Legal Drafting,22 provides helpful
insight into historical views on the debate between traditional and
modem language in contracts. Dickerson stands as an early proponent
of clarity in contract drafting and provides suggestions for modernizing
contract language, while recognizing that contracts constitute a
communication whose "ultimate audience includes the courts and other
agencies that may be called upon to enforce them. ,23
Dickerson, in providing his suggestions on drafting style, remains
cognizant of the fact that contractual "[c]ommunication is based on the
language habits of particular speech communities," and therefore
requires some "adherence to the existing conventions of language., 24 He
notes that a drafter who neglects the fact that the audience of a contract
"is part of an established speech community" does so at her own peril.25
While recognizing that contracts should be intelligible to the lay client,
Dickerson does not go so far as to encourage the wholesale removal of
all terms of art.26
Specifically, in the section of his book devoted to "Suggestions on
Specific Wording," Dickerson foreshadows modem drafting scholars by
suggesting the removal of words like "aforementioned" and
20. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
21. Preston M. Torbert, Contract Drafting: A Socratic Manifesto, 14 SCRIBES J.
LEGAL WRITING 93, 95 (2012).
22. DICKERSON, supra note 17.
23. Id. at 18.
24. Id. at 19.
25. Id. Note that Dickerson himself, writing in the era before gender-neutral drafting,
does not use the female pronoun. This Article will attempt to give gendered pronouns an
equal footing.
26. Id
456 [Vol. 65:451
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"hereinafter," because such wording constitutes "pure gobbledygook."27
Dickerson also suggests the removal of "redundancies," "pairs of words
or expressions one of which includes the other," and "circuitous or
otherwise unnecessary expressions. ' 28 These edits, in Dickerson's view,
provide "greater general clarity" in the document, and leave "the fewest
possible language barriers between" a drafter and his audience. 29
Yet Dickerson pauses when considering how to treat "preferred
expressions" by suggesting that "terms of art often must be honored., 30
He notes that while removal of certain traditional, preferred language
may enhance readability, "[t]he draftsman [must] pay careful attention"
when considering its removal.31 Dickerson further suggests that "[t]he
draftsman should not change a term of art merely because it contains
words" that may be deemed to decrease readability.32 It is important to
note that operative terms, such as "hypothecate" or "time is of the
essence," do not even make Dickerson's list of phrases that should be
considered for removal.33 His list focuses more closely on phrases like
"in lieu of' and "per centum," which can be considered more archaic
than operative, since they have concise alternatives and have not been
heavily interpreted by courts and commentators.34
In viewing Dickerson's work, the reader must bear in mind that he
was writing in an era before the surge of the modem plain language
movement, which influenced the attitudes of modem contract drafting
scholars and encouraged enthusiasm for a wholesale redrafting of
complex contract language into plain terms understandable by lay
readers. Dickerson's measured approach concerning the redrafting of
traditional language contrasts somewhat sharply with suggestions made
by these more modem scholars. Dickerson's work stands as one of the
few voices on contract drafting style uninfluenced by the plain language
movement and provides helpful insights into redrafting for readability
while keeping the legal audience in mind. 5
27. DICKERSON, supra note 17, at 125.
28. Id. at 125-26. Examples of each including "due and owing," "any and all," and
"mutually agree." Id.
29. Id. at 112.
30. Id. at 126-27.
31. DICKERSON, supra note 17, at 126-27.
32. Id. at 130.
33. Id. at 127-29.
34. Id. For example, "instead of" and "percent." Id. at 128-29.
35. Dickerson's is one of the only mid-century American texts available focusing
solely on contract drafting style (rather than a mixture of legislative and transactional
drafting), though at least one Australian text on the topic had been published earlier See J.K.
AITKEN, THE ELEMENTS OF DRAFTING (5th ed. 1976) (noting that a First Edition was
2015]
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B. The Dawn of Plain Language & Drafting Scholars'Responses
The intellectual foundation for the plain language movement was
built by David Mellinkoff in his 1963 book The Language of the Law,36
and the movement began to pick up speed in the American legal
academy with the publication of Richard Wydick's widely-cited Plain
English for Lawyers in 1979. 37 The movement is most often associated
with requirements for the use of "simplified language... in consumer
contracts ' '38 and the clarification of "the dense, impersonal prose of
most public documents. ' 39 Some drafting style scholars have recently
adopted the virtues of the movement in the non-consumer drafting
context, stating that "[c]losely related to the virtues of plain English is
the goal of drafting [contract] provisions that are clear and conspicuous
to non-lawyers. 4 °
This application of the plain language movement to contracts tends
to result in a focus on terms of art as an opportunity for modernization.
Some modem drafting style experts take aim at traditional language and
"terms of art, real or imagined," by suggesting their replacement with
straightforward alternatives. 4' Advocates of plain language support an
emphasis on "clear and effective communication-the opposite of
legalese" in all legal writing, including sophisticated commercial
contracts subject to judicial interpretation.42
By way of example, noted plain language advocate Bryan Garner
has suggested that the goal of clarity, achieved in part through the use of
published in 1946).
36. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW (Little, Brown & Co. 1963). It is
important to note that even Mellinkoff, considered by many the father of the plain language
movement, stated that "[t]erms of art make ... compression and... precision possible. And
whenever such precision is both possible and desirable, the competent lawyer uses terms of
art at his command." Id. at 391.
37. See JOSEPH KIMBLE, WRITING FOR DOLLARS, WRITING TO PLEASE: THE CASE FOR
PLAIN LANGUAGE IN BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND LAW 47-48 (Carolina Academic Press
2012).
38. ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2, § 1.29; see also CARL FELSENFELD &
ALAN SIEGEL, WRITING CONTRACTS IN PLAIN ENGLISH 27-30 (1981) (noting that the
"objective" of "plain English" is "to make complex legal documents intelligible to the
average consumer" or "customer.").
39. Joseph Kimble, Writing for Dollars, Writing to Please, 6 SCRIBES J. LEGAL
WRITING 1, 3 (1997).
40. KUNEY, supra note 2, at 19. As mentioned, drafting scholars are careful to
distinguish their simplified drafting style suggestions from pure, consumer-driven plain
language, by labeling it as "standard English," "common English" and the like. See supra
text accompanying notes 4 and 6.
41. ADAMs, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2, § 1.22.
42. Kimble, supra note 39, at 1.
[Vol. 65:451
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plain language, extends to legal drafting.43 Particularly, he challenges as
"wrongheaded" the notion that "lawyers should draft contracts ... with
the judicial reader in mind."" Garner posits that a legalistic style is
detested by judges. 45 He suggests that the judiciary should not be the
focus in making drafting choices because they are "back-end users" and
"only a small fraction of 1%" of all contracts are ever litigated.46 In
Garner's view, contracts should be written for ordinary readers rather
than "remote decision maker[s]. ' '
Widely-cited drafting expert Kenneth A. Adams 48 also supports a
broad-ranging application of plain language to contracts. In discussing
the distinction between plain language in consumer contracts and
language choices in sophisticated contracts, Adams notes that the use of
"standard English" (his variation on the plain language theme) provides
a benefit even in sophisticated contracts, since by its use "a drafter can
articulate a transaction without recourse to usages that interfere
gratuitously with the ability of any reader-lawyer or non-lawyer-to
understand the contract." 49 Thus, Adams suggests a wholesale "purge[]
of archaisms" in order to reduce "distance between the text and the
reader."'50
Adams specifically states that recognition of the judiciary as an
audience that consistently interprets time tested terms of art is merely a
"lazy platitude," or "excuse" for failing to redraft such clauses into
standard English.51 Adams further asserts that "traditional contract
language" is rooted in a nagging linguistic "dysfunction."52 Drafting
scholars have also posited that lawyers remain rooted in traditional
language based on a "fear of being original."53 Others suggest that
lawyers who employ tested terms are drafting passively, "submissively
43. BRYAN A. GARNER, THE ELEMENTS OF LEGAL STYLE 4-5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d
ed. 2002).
44. GARNER, PLAIN ENGLISH, supra note 2 at 109.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 109, 111.
48. The Board of Directors of the Legal Writing Institute presented Adams with the
2014 Golden Pen Award. See Legal Writing Institute, Ken Adams: 2014 Golden Pen Award
Recipient, ADAMS ON CONTRACT DRAFTING (2014), http://www.adamsdrafting.com /wp/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/Golden-Pen-Ken-Adams-2014.pdf.
49. ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2, § 1.29.
50. Id. § 1.5.
51. Id. §§ 1.32, 1.36.
52. Kenneth A. Adams, It's Time to Get Rid of the "Successors and Assigns"
Provision, 56 ADvOc. 30, 30 (2013) [hereinafter Adams, Successor and Assigns].
53. PETER SIVIGLIA, WRITING CONTRACTS: A DISTINCT DISCIPLINE 73 (Carolina
Academic Press 2d prtg. 2001).
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awaiting judges' decisions on the documents they draft" and should
rather undertake "a systematic initiative to draft in a way that would
avoid litigation. 5 4
The effect of the plain language movement on drafting scholarship
results in a blinkered focus on the modernization of language,
readability to clients, and dismissal of the judiciary as an important
audience. This modem approach also lacks the thoughtful analysis of
audience employed by Dickerson, particularly the recognition that the
"secondary audience" of a contract "is the court., 55 Drafters who retain
traditional terms attempt to avoid litigation by employing terms that
have been consistently interpreted by courts and have a known meaning
amongst practitioners and sophisticated clients. 56 Also, the public policy
justifications of clarity in language are less applicable in the case of
negotiated commercial contracts between sophisticated parties
represented by counsel, due to the unlikelihood that lay readers would
ever become an audience.
Additionally, not all modem drafting scholars cling to plain
language as a basis for wholesale redrafting of terms of art. 57 Peter
Siviglia has suggested that avoiding the removal of form language that
has been interpreted by the judiciary is "not wrong," but rather
"prudently cautious." 58 If, as defined by drafting scholars, clarity in
contracts is grounded in "language that will be interpreted by all
subsequent readers in exactly the same way" 59 it would necessarily
follow that tested language, which is granted a consistent meaning by
judicial interpretation, may add clarity. Consistency and clarity serve as
strong potential motivators for drafters retaining these terms.
Further, Charles M. Fox, a long-time practitioner-turned-drafting-
scholar pointedly asserts, even more recently, that:
54. Torbert, supra note 21, at 100.
55. DICKERSON, supra note 17, at 19.
56. This approach also has the benefit of potentially avoiding costly malpractice
liability based on the inclusion of "iffy" clauses. See Gregory M. Duhl, The Ethics of
Contract Drafting, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 989, 1012, 1019 (2010). The issue of ethical
liability in the context of contract drafting is an evolving one, and an area ripe for further
scholarship, though outside the scope of this Article.
57. See HOWARD DARMSTADTER, HEREOF, THEREOF, AND EVERYWHEREOF: A
CONTRARIAN GUIDE TO LEGAL DRAFTING 5-6 (ABA Publishing 2d ed. 2008) (Also noting
that while words such as "hereof' have a "distance from common speech [that] makes them
prime candidates for the chop," the author does not "object to legal terminology where it's
necessary to express a legal concept that has no compact equivalent in non-legal speech.").
58. SIVIGLIA, supra note 53, at 76.
59. WILLIAM K. SJOSTROM, JR., AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTRACT DRAFTING 16
(Thomson Reuters 2d ed. 2012).
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Effective writing consists of clear communication of the subject
matter to its intended audience. The audience for commercial contracts
is sophisticated business people and their lawyers. The notion that
commercial contracts should be written in plain English so as to be
understood by people who would never be expected to read them is an
unreasonable extension of the plain English movement .... [A]
contract that embodies a complex commercial transaction will contain
specialized diction and vocabulary familiar to its audience.60
Moreover, modem drafting scholar Tina Stark has argued that the
skill of contract drafting is premised on more than just style, and that
the successful drafter positions herself at the intersection of the
applicable law, the business deal, and the drafting details.6' She posits
that although pure legalese such as "herein" and "hereby" should be
replaced by "acceptable alternatives," the drafter must retain important
"substantive" phrases.62
Thus, the demonstrated tension between retaining and redrafting
traditional contract language in complex contracts hinges on modem
drafting scholarship's well-founded focus on the removal of legalese.
There can be little debate that "arcane and often formalistic jargon,"63
such as "herein," "whereas," and "wherefore," add little to the clarity of
contract text. This debate, however, turns on how contract drafters
define the edge of where "legal jargon that has an everyday English
equivalent" ends, and "unsimplifiable terms of art" begin.64
Modem drafting scholars' support of a more thoughtful focus on
language choices in contracts is laudable and has done much to improve
clarity in drafting. Certainly danger exists in allowing a useless
provision to survive because drafters "are unsure what function it serves
and so are loath to get rid of it."'65 The fact that drafting has become "an
exercise in regurgitation" results in a failure to "reimagine the options"
available for a specific type of transaction.66 Also, the use of
"promiscuous copying" results in mistakes, and "misconceptions as to
60. CHARLES M. Fox, WORKING WITH CONTRACTS: WHAT LAW SCHOOL DOESN'T
TEACH You 73 (Practising Law Inst. 2d ed. 2008).
61. TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS: How AND WHY LAWYERS Do WHAT THEY
Do 3 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business 2d ed. 2014).
62. Id. at 256-59.
63. SJOSTROM, supra note 59, at 17.
64. GARNER, PLAIN ENGLISH, supra note 2, at 45.
65. Adams, Successors and Assigns, supra note 52, at 31.
66. Kenneth A. Adams, The New Associate and the Future o Contract Drafting, 245
N.Y. L.J. 62, Apr. 1, 2011, (Outside Counsel), at 4 [hereinafter Adams, New Associate],
available at http://www.adamsdrafting.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/NYLJ-New-
Assoc-Future-of-Contract-Drafting-Directors-Cut.pdf.
2015]
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the legal effect of phrases" can have disastrous consequences for
contract clarity and precision.67
And yet, if the stated purpose of plain language is cited as
"bridg[ing] the gap between what you know and what [your] reader
knows,, 68 this purpose is less well-served when one of the audiences, as
Dickerson suggests, is a court tasked with interpretation of the
contract.69 On the contrary, in such instances perhaps "an unusual word
is exactly right for the job. 7 ° Certainly there are cases where words
become archaic and are no longer "doing a useful job., 71 But upon
deeper examination, terms of art differ from legalese, boilerplate, and
useless jargon. Terms of art are thus particularly useful in the context of
judicially-interpreted contracts, because they are known by the judicial
audience "as having a particular meaning."72
While bemoaning the fact that drafters who retain terms of art
"rarely get around to offering arguments to support"7 3 their decision,
modem drafting experts who call for the removal of terms of art
similarly fail to undertake a thoughtful analysis of the motives of these
drafters. According to a post on Adams' popular blog, "[t]he nature of
traditional contract language suggests that for most practicing lawyers,
notions of quality come a distant second to expediency., 74 This
assertion begs the question of why the notion of thoughtful drafting
requires an implied assertion that drafters are choosing to retain
traditional terms of art based on "expediency" or "submission," rather
than on a conscious choice. Particularly, the assertion that "someone
cannot draft a contract without understanding how a judge might
interpret it"'75 weakens the argument that language choices within the
contract are thoughtless.
67. Kenneth A. Adams, The Illusion of Quality in Contract Drafting, 248 N.Y. L.J.
11, July 17, 2012, (Outside Counsel), at 4, available at
http://www.adamsdrafting.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Illusion-of-Quality-
NYLJ.pdf
68. MARTIN CuTrs, THE PLAIN ENGLISH GUIDE 20 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
69. DICKERSON, supra note 17, at 19.
70. CuTrs, supra note 68, at 21. By way of example, Adams notes that it "would be
awkward to draft a security agreement without using the noun perfection or the verb perfect,
terms of art relating to security interests." ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2, § 1.9.
71. CUTTS, supra note 68, at 22.
72. Robert C. Illig, A Business Lawyer's Bibliography: Books Every Dealmaker
Should Read, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 585, 625 (2012).
73. ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2, § 1.36.
74. Kenneth A. Adams, A New Article on Teaching Contract Drafting, ADAMS ON
CONTRACT DRAFTING (Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.adamsdrafting.com/a-new-article-on-
teaching-contract-drafting/.
75. Torbert, supra note 21, at 100.
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Thus, consideration of the judicial audience is a recognized and
supported argument against some modem drafting scholars' view
concerning the redrafting of traditional terms of art. Further, there exists
little empirical data to support the assertion of these modem drafting
scholars that the choice to retain terms of art is rooted in a tradition of
thoughtless, expedient drafting. Despite assertions that rationalizations
for retaining tradition language "fall apart" upon examination, 76 very
little formal examination of the motivations of the drafters has been
undertaken. Adams himself notes that "evidence" for the expediency
argument is "necessarily anecdotal," though "overwhelming. 77
On the other hand, there exists clear scientific and literary support
for the notion that retaining terms of art provides benefit. The existing
theories and empirical studies of the use of terms of art must be
explored in order to more fully deconstruct the push for wholesale
redrafting and to demonstrate the need for rhetorical criticism as a
possible mode of determining drafter motives.
C. Empirical and Literary Support for Retention of Terms of Art
Not only can modem drafting scholars' views on terms of art be
disputed based on judicial audience considerations, recent studies
provide supplementary theories supporting the benefits of retention of
traditional terms in sophisticated contracts. Particularly, Mitu Gulati and
Robert E. Scott's work studying the use of the pari passu clause in
sovereign debt offering transactions,78 and Tal Kastner's work on
authorship notions in contracts, provide support for the retention of
traditional terms of art.79
Gulati and Scott's complex and lengthy study of the pari passu
clause discusses potential theories for the retention (or "stickiness") of
"standard, widely used clause[s]," such as those included in the
sovereign debt offering contracts they studied.8" These theories have
76. Adams, New Associate, supra note 66, at 4.
77. Kenneth A. Adams, Dysfunction in Contract Drafting: The Causes and a Cure, 15
TENN. J. Bus. L. 317, 324 (2014) [hereinafter Adams, Dysfunction].
78. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 119-138 (performing an empirical analysis
of the use oftheparipassu clause in sovereign bond contract transactions).
79. See generally, Tal Kastner, What is a Contract?: The Absent Author of the Written
Contract and the Function of Certain Conventions of Drafting and Construction (Princeton
Univ., Working Paper No. 814068, 2005), available at http://ssm.com!abstract=-814068
(applying Foucault's theories to contracts).
80. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 10-11. It is important to note that Gulati and
Scott undertook a wide-ranging empirical study of the use of the pari passu clause, which
while a slightly lengthier than the typical, expedient "term of art," is nonetheless helpful to
examine due to its nature as a clause that has been traditionally used and heavily judicially
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direct applicability to the consideration of the possible motives of
drafters in retaining any operative terms of art.
Gulati and Scott propose that there is "no inefficient stickiness" of
standard terms. 81 They suggest a variety of hypotheses to support the
theory that these standard terms will only change when motivated by
"costly litigation."82 Specifically, the theory of "learning externalities"
provides support for drafters' retention of terms of art. This theory
provides that the longer terms are used, the "better [they are]
understood. 83 This sense that risks of using the language are known
and understood leads to "understanding and confidence in the
'reliability' of these terms," particularly since they are unlikely to be
"erroneous[ly] interepret[ed] by a court.,8 4 Therefore, higher risk and
less efficiency would result in the use of alternative terms, motivating
drafters to retain the time-tested terms of art.
Gulati and Scott also propose that "network externalities" may
explain the "stickiness" of tested terms. This theory provides that
"products become more useful as the number of users increase." 85
Therefore, a "single actor attempting a change in its contracts faces a
risk that the lack of uniformity ... will result in a significant...
penalty. 86 The theory of "satisficing" also supports efficiency as a
cause of retaining terms of art.87 Since preparing contracts is "costly and
subsequent adverse events are rare," drafters often take the more
efficient and "costless" approach of integrating tested language.88 These
theories support the notion that retaining terms of art has benefit in spite
of the style concerns associated with traditional phrasing.
In direct contrast to the arguments of modern drafting scholars that
terms of art are retained based on inertia, the theory for "stickiness" that
Gulati and Scott found "most implausible" was that of "inadvertent
copying."8 9 The study authors note that when reviewing the dataset they
commented upon. The full study will not be discussed in detail here, but it is important to
note that it was criticized by Adams as "unconvincing." Adams, Dysfunction, supra note 77,
at 326. The focus of the discussion of Gulati and Scott's work in this Article will be on
applying the scientific theories they cite for the persistence of traditional clauses in modem
drafting.
81. GULATI & ScoTr, supra note 10, at 43.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 34.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 35.
86. GULATI & ScoTrr, supra note 10, at 35.
87. Id. at 37-38.
88. Id. at 37.
89. Id. at 121.
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collected concerning the inclusion of the pari passu clause in
"sovereign bond contracts," the theory that the term was retained solely
based on "inadvertent copying... beg[an] to unravel.' 90 Particularly,
the study authors noted that there were various edits to and permutations
of the term, despite its repeated inclusion in this type of contract.91
Thus, Gulati and Scott's study provides a counterargument to the
assertion that drafters thoughtlessly retain terms of art.
Other possible explanations for drafters' choices to retain of terms
of art may be rooted in long-standing and culturally-accepted notions
concerning the literary status and authorship of contracts. Particularly,
drafting scholars have noted that contracts fall outside of the standard
dichotomy of literary forms, consisting of "creative" or "expositive"
literature.92 Rather, contracts exist as a separate form of writing that
"transcribe the negotiated intent of two or more persons into a set of
instructions or specifications-a blueprint for a relationship. '" 93
Viewing contracts in this manner, it becomes easy for scholars to
divorce the drafter from a conscious role as an author of the document,
thoughtfully making choices to retain or redraft terms of art, and to
paint the drafter as a scribe simply regurgitating the intent of others.
This characterization makes the hypothesis that contract drafters retain
terms of art found in forms due to inertia94 more plausible.
Furthering the theory of passive drafting has been a cultural
acceptance of contracts as "authorless" documents, propounded
primarily by Michel Foucault.95 Foucault, in his influential essay
entitled "What is an Author?" notes that while a contract "may well
have a guarantor-it does not have an author."96 This absence of author,
according to Foucault, impacts the understanding of contract language
as a distinct mode of discourse.97 The absent author concept implies that
the contract "does not enjoy the function of the author as an
90. Id.
91. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 122-23. Similarly, there are various different
formulations of many modem terms of art, particularly the time is of the essence clause. See
Gertrude Block, Language Tips, 86-APR N.Y. ST. B.J. 61, 61 (Mar./Apr. 2014) (providing
guidance to practitioners concerning the most effective phrasing of this term of art).
92. See SIVIGLIA, supra note 53 at 11 (noting that "[p]lays, poetry, novels and short
stories are creative" and "essays, memoranda and briefs are expository").
93. Id.
94. ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2, § 1.5.
95. See Kastner, supra note 79, at 4.
96. MICHEL FOUCAULT, What is an Author?, in 2 AESTHETICS, METHOD, AND
EPISTEMOLOGY 211 (James D. Faubion ed., The New Press 1998).
97. Kastner, supra note 79, at 4.
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authoritative interpretive principle," as is the case in typical literature.98
The theory of the absent author thus affects the search for meaning
in the use of contract language, because, as law and literature scholar
Tal Kastner notes:
The law generally seeks systems of interpretation that will identify the
correct, or best, meaning of a text, and, as such, is continually engaged
in the limitation of meaning, or the development of principles
analogous to the author function in literary discourse. The text of the
contract, which itself functions within the parameters of the law, is
ostensibly the product of the parties' efforts to solidify-and thereby
enforce-the substance of their agreement. As instruments of
agreement intended to govern the behavior of the parties, written
contracts represent attempts to fix consensual meaning in a text, and
consequently enlist the attendant authority of the law.
99
Although the drafter's personal identity as an author may not
function to fix meaning, particularly where a contract is heavily
negotiated by a number of drafters,100 the function of the author to
communicate meaning exists in a contract through applicable principles
of interpretation applied by courts and commentators. 1 ' The
consistency of interpretation provided by commentators sets boundaries
around the meaning of language in the same way that the notion of
authorship functions to provide "homogeneity" and "reciprocal
explication" in Foucault's analysis.1
0 2
It follows logically that efforts to fix meaning in a contract find
root in language choices, which are inherently decided upon by the
drafter, whether by retaining certain terms from a form or independently
adding them. Terms of art, specifically, as they are heavily commented
upon and interpreted by courts and commentators, have a particularly
strong connection to the idea of authorship and meaning in the
contractual context. Terms of art, based upon the imposition and
bounding of meaning by courts and commentators, necessarily function
as language "that must be received in a certain mode and that, in a given
culture, must receive a certain status."'0 3 Therefore, a drafter's choice
to retain such terms, even from a form, is a choice to adopt a certain
mode of discourse and a particular meaning.
98. Id. at 5.
99. Id. at 5-6.
100. Id. at 6.
101. Kastner, supra note 79, at 6-7.
102. FOUCAULT, supra note 96, at 211.
103. Id.
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This necessary recognition of "writer, audience, reality, and
language" that occurs each time a drafter makes a choice whether to
retain or add a term of art places the drafter's choice clearly within the
process of communication,"' and therefore able to be studied through
rhetorical criticism. Simply put, the choice of whether to include terms
of art, as made by the contract drafter, constitutes a motivated,
rhetorical choice which "mark[s] off the edges"10 5 of meaning in the
contract. Thus, additional theories support the thesis that drafters have
particular motivations for retaining traditional contract terms beyond
pure inertia.
D. Moving Forward to Discover Motive
Based on the theory that the employment of a term of art is a
motivated language choice, rhetorical criticism becomes the appropriate
method to determine drafters' particular motives in retaining terms of
art.
While Adams suggests that "[j]ust because a court attributes a
particular meaning to a bit of confusing contract language doesn't mean
that drafters should stick with [it],' 1 6 the motive of the drafter must be
explored in order to determine whether the intent in using an easily
recognizable term of art is actually the avoidance of confusion.
Rhetorical criticism in the tradition of Kenneth Burke can assist in
supporting the argument that careful drafters make thoughtful choices to
retain terms of art. This mode of criticism serves as a helpful and
appropriate tool for making the determination of the drafter's motive in
retaining terms of art, as rhetoric assists in "the attributing of
motives. ' 1 7 In order to proceed with this rhetorical technique, a
particular artifact of contract language functioning as a term of art must
first be chosen and described, the Burkean method must be explained in
detail, and the pentadic analysis of the chosen artifact undertaken.
This Article will proceed with this rhetorical analysis in the
following three sections, and conclude that drafters who retain
traditional terms of art are motivated by a desire to advocate for their
clients in light of potential favorable judicial interpretations. This
conclusion motivates several recommendations for drafters in
employing traditional terms of art.
104. Linda L. Berger, Applying the New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb and
Flow of Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 157 (1999).
105. FOUCAULT, supra note 96, at 211.
106. Id.
107. BURKE, GRAMMAR, supra note 12, at xv.
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II. TERMS OF ART IN DETAIL: TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE
Literary tastes may differ, of course, but it's worth knowing what
judges say-and have been saying for a long time-about the language
we lawyers use.
- Bryan A. Garner 10 8
In order to understand drafters' potential motives in retaining terms
of art, the rhetorical critic must first deeply understand how terms of art
function generally, and how the time is of the essence clause functions
particularly. Another way to define a legal term of art is as "a short
expression that (a) conveys a fairly well-agreed meaning, and (b) saves
the many words that would otherwise be needed to convey that
meaning."10 9 This definition excludes many of the examples of legalese
or "lawyerisms" which the plain language movement seeks to purge, 010
and catches many phrases used consistently by lawyers who seek to
tailor their "choice of words" to their reader."' Proponents of drafting
style, therefore, often tread lightly when it comes to advocating for a
removal or redrafting of such terms." 2
Nonetheless, some modem contract drafting scholars have gone
beyond suggestions to use plain language in lieu of meaningless
legalese, and begun to specifically call for a removal or redrafting of
terms of art. For example, Peter Siviglia instructs drafters to "not use
terms of art ... because these terms comprehend too many variables."'' 13
Siviglia specifically identifies terms like "right of first refusal" and
"after-tax earnings" as examples of terms of art that are too broad to be
used effectively in drafting."l 4
Additionally, according to Ken Adams, "[l]egal terms of art add
complexity""' 5 and while some allow "concepts to be articulated with a
minimum amount of fuss,"" 6 Adams dubs others problematic.117
108. Bryan A. Garner, Judges on Effective Writing: The Importance of Plain
Language, MICH. BAR J., Feb. 2005, at 44, available at
http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/pdf4article845.pdf
109. RICHARD C. WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS 19 (Carolina Academic
Press 5th ed. 2005).
110. See KUNEY, supra note 2, at 47 (noting that phrases like "Witnesseth," "Now,
Therefore," and "Know all men by these presents" can be eliminated and "common
English" used "in their place").
111. WYDICK, supra note 109 at 58.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
113. SIVIGLIA, supra note 53, at 17 (emphasis omitted).
114. Id
115. ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2, § 1.8.
116. Id. § 1.7.
117. Id. §§ 1.7-.10.
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Adams suggests in his writing that drafters rely on terms of art and other
tested language choices because they are "safer than expressing
meaning clearly using standard English."' 18 In his widely adopted
Manual of Style for Contract Drafting, Adams calls for the replacement
of several terms of art with "straightforward alternatives. ' 119
The problems with the terms of art identified by Adams fall into
three main categories: (i) misapplied terms of art; (ii) improvised terms
of art; and (iii) top-heavy terms of art. 120 The focus of this analysis will
be the top-heavy terms of art, those identified by Adams as having "a
meaning that's fairly well established but that's also sufficiently broad,
or sufficiently complex, that drafters are quick to use them without fully
appreciating the implications.,"121 Adams suggests that the use of such
top-heavy terms of art often result in unenforceability of the term, or
unanticipated consequences. 122 A detailed discussion of a top-heavy
term of art, the time is of the essence clause, helps to flesh out the
debate concerning whether to redraft such terms, and the possible
motivations for retention.
A. An Overview of the Time is of the Essence Clause
One of the top-heavy terms of art targeted by Adams for removal
or redrafting is the time is of the essence clause.' 23 The time is of the
essence clause is widely-used, and clearly functions as a term of art,
since it more succinctly expresses a complex concept concerning the
requirement for timely performance of contractual obligations. In more
detail, according to Williston on Contracts, the function of the time is of
the essence clause can be described as follows:
In any contract, one party may make a promise expressly conditional
on the exact performance of any agreed term, including that
performance shall occur on a specified day or hour or before a
specified day. Moreover, although performance at the specified time is
in terms merely a promise, if the parties also provide that time is of the
118. Id. § 1.36.
119. Id. § 1.22. Specifically, Adams suggests that replacing problematic terms of art
causes "[c]ontracts [to] be clearer" and "makes life easier for the reader." ADAMS, MANUAL
OF STYLE, supra note 2, §§ 1.22, 1.26. While Adams does concede that replacing such terms
may result in "too much fruitless debate" and cautions the drafter to consider "whether
there's any indication that courts accord significance to use of that term of art," he
concludes that since courts "don't have a literal-minded approach to terms of art," such
terms should often be replaced. Id. §§ 1.23, 1.27.
120. Id. §§ 1.10-.21.
121. Id. § 1.21.
122. Id.
123. ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2, §§ 1.21, 13.687-.697.
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essence, in those or equivalent words, they effectively agree that a
breach of that promise is material or, in other words, that timely
performance is in effect an express condition precedent to the
promisee's duty to render the counter-performance under the
contract. 
124
In a slightly shorter iteration, Black's Law Dictionary defines the
term to mean a contractual requirement "so important that if the
requirement is not met, the promisor will be held to have breached the
contract and a rescission by the promisee will be justified. '1 25 Based on
the length of the explanation of the term required by these sources to
describe the concept, it becomes clear that "time is of the essence"
functions as a prime example of a term of art that could be considered
by drafters as a useful phrase to reduce length and fuss.
However, Adams asserts several well-reasoned problems with the
use of time is of the essence in modem contract drafting.126 He argues
that despite the fact that "courts tend to hold that late performance isn't
grounds for termination unless the" parties clearly state the "time is of
the essence [clause] isn't up to the task" of clearly expressing parties'
intent that failure of timely performance constitutes a material breach. 127
Adams notes that time is of the essence clauses are often misused
by drafters who mistakenly include an overbroad statement that "Time
is of the essence of this agreement."'128  This construction is "too
general," as it fails to specifically identify a particular contract provision
for which the failure to timely perform is intended by the parties to
result in a material breach.129
Adams' proposed solution to the issue of specificity with time is of
the essence, with regard particularly to a closing date in a contract,
would be to rephrase the provision as follows:
The parties acknowledge that due to [describe time constraints on the
parties], if a party wishes to terminate this contract in accordance with
section X [the drop-dead-date provision], that party will not be
required to give the other party any time beyond the Drop-Dead Date
to allow that party to satisfy any condition or perform any obligation
under this agreement. 130
124. 15 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 46:3 (Thomson Reuters 4th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).
125. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1196 (9th ed. 2009).
126. ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2, § 13.690-.694.
127. Id. § 13.690 (emphasis omitted).
128. Id. § 13.691.
129. Id.
130. Id. § 13.697.
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While this redrafted provision specifically elucidates the
consequence of a failure to timely close, it is considerably wordier than
the possible alternative term of art statement that "Time is of the
essence with regard to the Drop-Dead Date." Therefore, this proposed
redraft actually violates one of the rules of contract drafting style
commonly cited by drafting scholars, that of concision.'31
While Adams rightly identifies some challenges to the usefulness
and appropriate application of the time is of the essence clause,
practitioners and drafting experts have continued to recognize the utility
of the provision, even in recent practitioner-oriented publications. This
affinity for the phrase may be due, in part, to the length of proposed
alternatives. Specifically, in noting that the phrase "time is of essence"
would be preferable to the longer rephrasing of "time is essential to the
contract," legal language expert Gertrude Block advises practitioners to
use the former term, reasoning that the term "is well understood and
well-respected by the courts," and "[preferable] to its alternative."'' 32
Therefore, while Adams' criticisms of the time is of the essence
clause have merit, the term continues to be used consistently by drafters
today. It remains, similar to the pari passu clause identified in Gulati
and Scott's study, 133 a problematic, yet "sticky" example of traditional
contract language. A rhetorical analysis of a particular use of the term
can provide insight into the possible motives of drafters in retaining this
particular term of art, despite modern scholarship to the contrary and
associated problems of interpretation and application.
B. Time is of the Essence in Practice: A Case Study
In considering the practical implications of the decision whether to
include a particular term of art in a complex commercial contract
between sophisticated parties, no better case study exists than that of the
time is of the essence clause. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit recently issued a decision overturning a nearly five
million dollar damage award, based in part on the inclusion of a time is
131. See, e.g., SCOTT J. BuRNHAM, DRAFTING AND ANALYZING CONTRACTS 291
(LexisNexis 3d ed. 2003) ("Replace wordy phrases."); DICKERSON, supra note 17, at 113
("The draftsman should avoid long sentences when shorter ones will say the same thing as
well."); THOMAS R. HAGGARD & GEORGE W. KUNEY, LEGAL DRAFTING IN A NUTSHELL 8
(Thompson/West 3d ed. 2007) ("Being concise means saying all that needs to be said with
the fewest number of words. . . concision is an essential element of good drafting.");
ROBERT J. MARTINEAU & MICHAEL B. SALERNO, LEGAL, LEGISLATIVE, AND RULE DRAFTING
IN PLAIN ENGLISH 53 (Thomson/West 2005) ("[T]he elimination of unnecessary words
enhances the readability and understanding of what is written.").
132. Block, supra note 91, at 61.
133. See generally GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10.
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of the essence clause in an amended loan agreement. 134
The Gaia House case provides an example of the effect of the 2008
collapse of the credit markets on existing loan agreements, 135 and a lens
through which to view the impact of choosing to include a term of art in
a sophisticated commercial contract. In Gaia House, the Second Circuit
overturned a bench trial judgment from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York ruling that the borrower in a
complex, multi-level loan transaction was entitled to the return of
accrued interest it had paid under protest in excess of $4.5 million
dollars, along with certain professional fees and damages. 136
The factual background of the case is intricate, but understanding
the main facts is important in setting the background for the use of the
time is of the essence clause and consideration of the drafter's
motivations. The borrower, Gaia House Mezz, LLC ("Gaia House
Mezz"), entered into a Mezzanine Loan Agreement 137 in 2006 with
Lehman Brothers to finance the construction of a condominium building
in the trendy West Chelsea neighborhood of Manhattan. 138 The
Mezzanine Loan Agreement contained a time is of the essence clause
stating that "[t]ime is of the essence of each and every term of this Loan
Agreement."' 139  Upon Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy in 2008, State
Street Bank and Trust Company ("State Street") assumed the loan and
began a course of dealing with Gaia House Mezz concerning the loan
throughout the troubled economic times following the collapse of the
real estate and credit markets. 140
134. Gaia House Mezz LLC v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 720 F.3d 84, 94 (2d Cir.
2013) (Note that the opinion uses hyphens when describing the "time-is-of-the-essence"
clause, which will be avoided here for the sake of readability and consistency.).
135. See id.
136. Id. at 87.
137. Id.; see generally Steven Horowitz & Lise Morrow, Mezzanine Financing, Real
Estate Financing Documentation: Strategies for Changing Times, ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STUDY, SM008 ALI-ABA 683, 685-688 (2007) (explaining that Mezzanine Financing was a
popular loan structure prior to the 2008 collapse of the capital markets, which permitted
borrowers (typically in the real estate industry), the ability to "obtain higher levels of loan
proceeds" without resorting to the typical first and second mortgage structure). A mezzanine
loan would be secured by a pledge of equity interests in the borrower entity to the
mezzanine lender, rather than a mortgage on the property itself (which was typically
encumbered by a primary mortgage loan, often from a different lender). Id This type of
financing was thus more expensive and more risky than a standard real estate loan, since it
was junior and unsecured by the property. Id
138. Gaia House MezzLLC, 720 F.3d at 87.
139. Joint Appendix Volume III of VIII at JA-446, Gaia House Mezz LLC, 720 F.3d
84 (2013).
140. Gaia House Mezz LLC, 720 F.3d at 87-89.
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State Street and Gaia House Mezz entered into three modifications
to the original Mezzanine Loan Agreement, the latter two of which are
relevant here. The impetus for making these modifications was Gaia
House Mezz's inability to pay off the loan by the original maturity date
of July 1, 2009 (at which time Gaia House Mezz owed State Street
approximately $20.7 million in principal and $10.1 million in
interest).' In addition to extending the maturity date of the loan, these
modifications, executed in September 2009 and May 2010, respectively,
also required Gaia House Mezz to substantially complete the building
and obtain a temporary certificate of occupancy ("TCO") for certain
units in the building by a specific date. 142
Additionally, the Second Modification to the Mezzanine Loan
Agreement dated September 23, 2009 (the "Second Modification")
provided, in pertinent part: "[I]f the entire Debt, other than the...
[Accrued Interest], is paid in full on the [extended] Scheduled Maturity
Date and no Event of Default occurs prior to such Scheduled Maturity
Date, Lender shall waive the payment of Accrued Interest from
Borrower." '143 It also contained a time is of the essence provision
stating that "[t]ime is of the essence of each provision of this
Agreement."144
According to the Second Circuit, these provisions "had the effect
of freezing interest at $10.1 million and providing an interest-free loan
on the $20.7 million in principal, provided there were no future Events
of Default."' 45 Unfortunately, Gaia House Mezz committed several
additional Events of Default after execution of the Second Modification,
including the failure to obtain the TCO by the specified date.146
The parties then entered into the Third Loan Modification on May
19, 2010 (the "Third Modification"), which provided Gaia House Mezz
until July 15, 2010 to obtain the TCO. 1 47 The Third Modification also
contained a time is of the essence provision stating that "'time is of the
essence of each provision of this Agreement."",148 This provision
141. Id. at 87-88.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 88. The term "Accrued Interest" referred to any interest in excess of the
$10.1 million owed upon the original maturity date of the Mezzanine Loan Agreement. Id.
144. Joint Appendix Volume IV of VIII at JA-818, Gaia House Mezz LLC, 720 F.3d
84 (2013).
145. Gaia House Mezz LLC, 720 F.3d at 88.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Reply in Support of State Street's Motion to Dismiss Gaia's Equitable Estoppel
Claim at 5, Gaia House Mezz, LLC v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 2012 WL 1530385
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2012) (No. 1:11-cv-03186-TPG), 2011 WL 8198348, at *5.
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specifically related to the extended July 15, 2010 deadline to obtain the
TCO. Nonetheless, Gaia House Mezz also missed this extended
deadline. 149 Therefore, on December 2, 2010, State Street notified Gaia
House Mezz of this and other Events of Default and stated "that,
because of the Events of Default, State Street was not required to waive
the Accrued Interest."' 150
In July 2011, Gaia House Mezz paid the outstanding balance of the
loan to State Street, and also paid the $4.5 million in disputed Accrued
Interest and additional associated professional fees, under protest.' 51 In
order to pay the Accrued Interest, Gaia House Mezz was required to
obtain a loan from a third-party lender, and therefore incurred $328,097
in loan fees, which Gaia House Mezz later claimed as damages when
they filed suit against State Street to obtain the return of the Accrued
Interest and professional fees. 152
The district court ruled, after a bench trial, and without considering
the time is of the essence provisions included in the Second
Modification and the Third Modification, that "Gaia House earned [a
refund of] the Accrued Interest.' ' 153 Therefore, the district court judge
ordered the return to Gaia House Mezz of "$4,558,500, the full amount
of the Accrued Interest it overpaid," along with a portion of the
professional fees, and "an award of $328,097" representing the loan
fees for the loan used to pay the Accrued Interest. 54
In reversing and remanding the district court's decision, the
Second Circuit accepted the argument made by State Street's attorneys
that the application of the time is of the essence provisions included in
the original Mezzanine Loan Agreement and each of the Amendments
made the extended "July 15 deadline" to obtain the TCO "material as a
matter of law,"'' 55 and that the time is of the essence clause included in
the Third Modification was "by itself dispositive in refuting Gaia's
'equity' claim"'' 56 for refund of the Accrued Interest and fees.
149. Gaia House Mezz LLC, 720 F.3d at 88
150. Id.
151. Id. at 89.
152. Id.
153. Gaia House Mezz, LLC v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., No. 11 Civ. 3186 (TPG),
2012 WL 1530385, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2012), rev'd, 720 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2013).
154. Id. at *24.
155. Gaia House Mezz LLC, 720 F.3d at 93-95; Brief of Defendant-Appellant State
Street Bank & Trust Co. at 31, Gaia House Mezz LLC, 720 F.3d 84 (No. 12-2481-cv), 2012
WL 5197396, at *31.
156. Reply in Support of State Street's Motion to Dismiss Gaia's Equitable Estoppel
Claim, supra note 148, at *5.
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Based on the inclusion of the time is of the essence provisions, the
Second Circuit directly criticized the district court's conclusion that the
Events of Default were "trivial or technical breaches" based on the
parties' clear designation of time as essential to the performance of
obligations by their deadlines.'5 7 According to the Second Circuit, the
inclusion of the clause "rendered the deadlines material."' 58
Interestingly, these clauses were each broadly constructed, and yet were
enforced by the Second Circuit with regard to the particular failure of
Gaia House Mezz to timely obtain the TCO, despite scholarship
criticizing the clarity and potential applicability of such broad
constructed provisions. 5
9
Although the Second Circuit includes ancillary reasoning for its
holding in favor of State Street, Gaia House Mezz's entire equity
argument concerning the return of the Accrued Interest and related fees
failed because the Second Circuit refused to disregard the significance
of the term of art time is of the essence. 6 This finding alone entitled
State Street both to retain the Accrued Interest and to avoid payment of
the $328,097 in financing damages.' 6' The choice of State Street's
attorneys to include that five word term of art in Section 20 of the Third
Modification caused a swing of nearly five million dollars in favor of
their client when considering whether the eventual breach of the
modified July 15th deadline included in that document was material.
162
This case stands as an paradigmatic example of the effect that the
inclusion of a term of art can have on a client's outcome in litigation,
and the importance of a measured approach when considering whether,
as suggested by modem scholars such as Adams and Siviglia,163 to
rephrase or remove terms of art focused on legal or judicial audiences
into plain English aimed at an unsophisticated client. While it is
unlikely a client would ever be called upon to read or interpret a
157. Gaja House Mezz LLC, 720 F.3d at 94.
158. Id.
159. See ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2, § 13.691.
160. Gaia House Mezz LLC, 720 F.3d at 94.
161. Id. at 87, 95.
162. State Street's attorney(s) most certainly drafted the Third Modification, as it is
overwhelmingly common practice in commercial real estate finance for lender-side
attorneys to serve as primary drafters of the loan documents and any modifications, while
borrowers' attorneys provide comments. Further, State Street's brief itself supports this
assertion, stating that "State Street twice restructured the loan because of Gaia's repeated
failures to complete construction on time" (emphasis added) and that "[i]n the
Modifications, State Street also added several provisions." Brief of Defendant-Appellant
State Street Bank & Trust Co., supra note 155, at *5, *10; Gaia House Mezz LLC, 720 F.3d
at 94-95.
163. ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2, § 1.5; SIVIGLIA, supra note 53, at 76.
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provision buried on the twelfth page of a sophisticated loan
modification document, the phrase can become critically important in
the eyes of a judge (particularly a trained appellate judge) when
reviewing the contract in detail in connection with litigation.
While Garner rightly notes that the circumstance of judicial
interpretation is somewhat rare, 164 the existence of language such as that
included in the Gaia House opinion can certainly have influence on
attorneys drafting contracts or negotiating for settlement on disputed
contracts, even prior to the litigation stage. Thus, the true impact of
judicial interpretations of these terms of art is difficult to measure
empirically, and may have more impact from the perspective of the
lawyer acting as advocate prior to a judicial interpretation. 1 65 Therefore,
a rhetorical analysis of the motives of the State Street attorneys in
including the traditional term of art can provide important insight to
practitioners faced with drafting scholars advocating for redrafting of
such language into plain terms.
While it is important to note that "[a] single provision in a specific
kind of contract is a slim basis for drawing conclusions regarding
transactional drafting as a whole,"'166 the determination of the rhetorical
and philosophical underpinnings of the choice to retain particular terms
of art provides insight into the behaviors of drafters, and possible
justifications for the retention of such language beyond Adams'
suggestion of pure inertia.' 67 In order to make these determinations,
Kenneth Burke's method of rhetorical analysis must be explained and
applied to the Third Modification between State Street and Gaia House
Mezz.
III. MODERN RHETORICAL CRITICISM: THE BURKEAN PENTAD
What is involved, when we say what people are doing
and why they are doing it?
- Kenneth Burke 168
Talk of rhetoric often conjures up images of orators employing
Aristotle's three topics of logos, ethos, and pathos in pursuit of the
persuasion of a crowd of jeering statesmen.' 69 Therefore, the
164. GARNER, PLAIN ENGLISH, supra note 2, at 109.
165. See generally Adams, Dysfunction, supra note 77 (criticizing Gulati & Scott's
empirical study of the paripassu clause).
166. Id. at318.
167. See ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2, § 1.5.
168. BURKE, GRAMMAR, supra note 12, at xv.
169. WENDY OLMSTEAD, RHETORIC: AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 15 (Blackwell
Publishing 2006).
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applicability of rhetorical criticism may seem "remote from the
concerns and needs of contemporary society,"' 7° particularly the
modem transactional attorney. However, rhetorical criticism can be
particularly helpful as "an art for 'breaking down' what has been
composed."' 171 In this sense, rhetoric becomes critical to understanding
why a modem contract drafter may retain traditional terms of art and to
what effect.
In order to most accurately apply rhetorical criticism to a
contemporary drafting issue, it is helpful to look to modem rhetorical
criticism. The "rebirth of rhetoric" in modem American scholarship
took root in the disciplines of communication and criticism.172 This dual
focus clearly applies to the question of why and how modem drafters
choose to communicate complex contract concepts, and rhetorical
criticism can and should be employed to provide insight into the
motives behind these drafters' choices.
The most commonly cited purpose of modem rhetorical criticism
"is concerned with effect. It regards speech as a communication to a
specific audience, and holds its business to be the analysis" of the
selected "method of imparting ... ideas.' 73 Modem rhetorical analysis
has been distinguished from the classical Aristotelian approach by
noting a focus on "man as essentially a 'rhetorical' or 'symbol
using' ... animal" who seeks a "cooperative relationship" with his
"audience.' ' 174 Thus, modem rhetorical criticism offers a tool to analyze
language choices in an evolving mode of discourse, providing a clear
contrast to classical rhetoric's focus on "formal persuasion"'175 in a
stable, "cohesive society."'176
Modem rhetorical criticism's focus on the study of symbol-using
by the rhetor provides particular insight into the study of legal drafting.
The "New Rhetoric" as applied to legal writers focuses "on what writers
'do' rather than on what writers 'know,' believing that what writers do
170. CORBETT & CONNORS, supra note 5, at 24.
171. Id.at25.
172. Robert J. Connors, Lisa S. Ede & Andrea A. Lunsford, The Revival of Rhetoric
in America, in ESSAYS ON CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND MODERN DISCOURSE 8 (Robert J.
Connors, Lisa S. Ede & Andrea A. Lunsford eds., S. Ill. Univ. Press 1984).
173. Herbert A. Wichelns, The Literary Criticism of Oratory, in METHODS OF
RHETORICAL CRITICISM: A TWENTIETH CENTURY PERSPECTIVE 67 (Bernard L. Brock &
Robert L. Scott eds., Wayne State Univ. Press 2d ed. 1980).
174. On Distinctions Between Classical and Modern Rhetoric, in ESSAYS ON
CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND MODERN DISCOURSE, supra note 172, at 38.
175. DANIEL FOGARTY, ROOTS FOR A NEW RHETORIC 130 (Bureau of Publ'ns, N.Y.
1959).
176. On Distinctions Between Classical and Modem Rhetoric, supra note 174, at 38.
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is how they come to know.""' What the drafter chooses to do and how
he does it is clearly a symbolic and rhetorical choice. Legal writing and
rhetoric scholars have even noted that the use of forms to draft legal
documents constitutes an attempt to "enter a particular ... discourse
community. ' As such, much can be learned from the application of
rhetorical criticism to a drafter's choice whether to retain terms of art or
use more modem language.
Rhetorical critic Kenneth Burke asserts the possibility of
discovering motive for rhetorical action through the application of a
five-term, or pentad, analysis based on dramatism. 179 In order to
understand the workings of this "pentad," one must first recognize the
two main assumptions underlying Burke's notion of dramatism: the
concepts of motion and action.1 80 Specifically, this understanding
requires recognition that action encompasses more than simply motion,
which Burke defines as primarily biological. 18 1 Rather, action
"originate[s] in our symbolicity, as when we strive to reach goals."'1 82
Burke argues that human conduct, including speech, is in the realm of
"symbolic action," with man (in this case, the drafter) as the "symbol-
maker."1 83
According to Burke, the strategic answers employed by drafters in
making symbolic language choices answer "questions posed by the
situation in which they arose."' 84 Further, the "mere act of naming an
object or situation decrees that it is to be singled out as such-and-such
rather than as something-other."' 185 Thus, the critic must view the choice
of how to present a message as the result of the rhetor acting in a
specific situation, much like an actor in a drama. 186  Dramatistic
analysis of the rhetor's choices can provide clues into the rhetor's
motives or why they do what they do. 187
177. Berger, supra note 104, at 156.
178. Kirsten K. Davis, Legal Forms as Rhetorical Transaction: Competency in the
Context of Information and Efficiency, 79 UMKC L. REv. 667, 669 (2011).
179. BURKE, GRAMMAR, supra note 12, at xv.
180. KENNETH BURKE, LANGUAGE AS SYMBOLIC ACTION: ESSAYS ON LIFE,
LITERATURE, AND METHOD 53 (Univ. of California Press 1966) [hereinafter BURKE,
LANGUAGE].
181. SONJA K. Foss, RHETORICAL CRITICISM: EXPLORATION AND PRACTICE 355-56
(Waveland Press, Inc. 4th ed. 2009).
182. Id. at 355.
183. BURKE, LANGUAGE, supra note 181, at 63.
184. KENNETH BURKE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LITERARY FORM: STUDIES IN SYMBOLIC
ACTION 1 (Louisiana State Univ. Press 2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter BURKE, LITERARY FORM].
185. Id. at 4.
186. BURKE, LANGUAGE, supra note 180, at 63.
187. Foss, supra note 181, at 356.
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In order to analyze the motive behind a particular rhetorical choice
(often referred to as the artifact being investigated), 88 Burke's pentad
analysis focuses on five main principles: "what was done (act), when or
where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how he did it (agency),
and why (purpose)."' 8 9 These five inquiries have been likened to the
five elements required in journalistic writing: "who? (agent), what?
(act), why? (purpose), when? and where? (scene)."190 It is important to
note, in understanding Burke's pentad, that "each of these elements is
interconnected in the structure of action," thus, "our understanding of
one term necessarily is tied to our understanding of all of the other
terms.
' 9 1
Therefore, the critic must look at each element required in the
pentad more closely in order to understand its application to a drafter's
choice whether to retain a particular term of art. First, the "agent," as
described by Burke, "embraces not only all words general or specific
for person, actor, character, individual," etc., but also words for
"motivational properties or agents" and "collective words for agent." 192
It has been recognized that the rhetor herself can serve as the agent in a
Burkean analysis.1 93 Burke's second element of the pentad, the "act,"
has been defined as "the rhetor's presentation of the major action
taken.., by the agent."' 94 A helpful way to think about Burke's act is to
"think of a thing not simply as existing, but rather as 'taking form,' or
as the record of an act which gave it form."'' 9
5
Next, Burke's concept of "agency" is rooted in the "means" used
to perform the act. 196 Burke identifies the agency as so important that
"ends become treated in terms of means."' 97 As such, terms of art, in
this analysis become the instrument or method by which the act is
achieved.' 98 Burke's fourth pentadic concept, the "scene," is "the kind
of stage the rhetor sets" for the act, including "social and cultural
influences."' 99 Burke describes the scene in terms of the background for
188. BuRKE, GRAMMAR, supra note 12, at xv.
189. Id.
190. Foss, supra note 181, at 357.
191. J. Clarke Rountree, III, Coming to Terms with Kenneth Burke's Pentad, I AM.
COMM. J. 2 (1998), available at http://ac-journal.org/joumal/voll/iss3/burke/rountree.html.
192. BuRKE, GRAMMAR, supra note 12, at 20.
193. Foss, supra note 182, at 358.
194. Id.
195. BuRKE, GRAMMAR, supra note 12, at 228.
196. Id. at 276.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 275.
199. Foss, supra note 181, at 358.
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the act, but going beyond this environmental conception of the scene,
Burke also views determination of the scene as a consideration of upon
what grounds the agent acted.2"'
The final component of the pentad is the "purpose," or the agent's
intention in acting.20' The "tools and methods" used by the agent are
thus used for a particular purpose.20 2 It is important to note that
"[p]urpose is not synonymous with motive., 203 Determination of
motive, while the goal of a pentadic analysis, requires an in-depth
inquiry into the "internal relationships which the five terms bear to one
another" and "their range of permutations and combinations., 20 4
Rhetorical scholars have suggested that this "pentad is particularly
adapted to an analysis of words," 205 such as terms of art invoked by
contract drafters, such as those in the Gaia House case. The pentad has
been identified as "a universal heuristic growing out of the very concept
of action recognized by writers on human motives. 20 6 Thus, the
application of the pentad to the use of time is of the essence in Gala
House can help solve the problem of determining the underlying motive
of the drafter in retaining the particular terms of art.
To apply the pentad, the critic must use ratios linking and
comparing the five terms of the pentad, as applied to the piece of
writing in question, in order to determine which term controls or
dominates. Within the dominant term, "Burke suggests, motive is
located., 20 7 Discovery of this motive helps us understand the "larger
explanation for the rhetor's action., 2 8 In the case of contract drafting,
the application of the pentad helps us understand the motive behind the
drafter's choice to employ terms of art rather than standard English, and
more importantly, helps us recognize the validity of that choice.
200. See BURKE, GRAMMAR, supra note 12, at 12.
201. See id. at 289.
202. Id.
203. Foss, supra note 181, at 358.
204. BuRKE, GRAMMAR supra note 12, at xvi.
205. Rountree, III, supra note 191, at 5.
206. Id.
207. Foss, supra note 181, at 357.
208. Id. at 358.
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE BURKEAN METHOD, RESULTS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
A word must maintain a correspondence to a reality beyond language
so that our words will mirror reality, the action of life.
- Jan M. Broekman
20 9
Having suggested the methodology, the rhetorical critic turns to
consideration of a specific drafter's choice to retain a traditional term of
art through the lens of the pentad, in order to determine motives and
philosophical influences that underpin such a choice. The application of
the pentad to the Third Modification to the Mezzanine Loan Agreement
between State Street and Gaia House Mezz provides important
rhetorical insights, and also motivates several recommendations that
practicing attorneys and drafting scholars can consider and apply
regarding traditional terms of art.
A. Application of Burke 's Pentad to the Third Modification
A rhetorical analysis of the Third Modification between State
Street and Gaia House Mezz, as interpreted by the Second Circuit in the
Gala House case, begins with an identification of the main pentadic
elements of the contract.21 ° Viewing State Street's attorney (the drafter
of the Third Modification) 211 as the rhetor, an understanding of the story
being told, and the potential motives for telling that story in a particular
way, come to light:
Agent: State Street
Act: Amending the Mezzanine Loan Agreement to
allow Gaia House Mezz an additional
opportunity to perform
Scene: During collapse of credit and real estate markets
and ongoing poor performance of Gaia House
Mezz under the Mezzanine Loan Agreement
209. Jeffrey A. Ellsworth, Semiotics in Legal Theory Design, in SEMIOTICS OF LAW IN
LEGAL EDUC. 137 (Jan M. Broekman & Francis J. Mootz, eds., Springer 2011).
210. The focus on the Third Modification to the Mezzanine Loan Agreement is
intentional, as the facts of the case and the related pleadings provide the most insight into
the background concerning this particular piece of drafting. Based on the retelling of facts,
there existed an ongoing, acrimonious relationship between the parties which provides an
interesting and informative "scene" for the pentadic analysis.
211. See supra text accompanying note 163. Note that for the remainder of the
Article, I will refer to the drafter as "she" in the interests of gender-neutral drafting, as the
gender of the drafter is unknown.
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Purpose: To extend certain deadlines previously breached
by Gaia House Mezz
Agency: Use of various revised contract terms, including
a traditional time is of the essence clause
Based on rhetorical principles, the rhetor uses the Third
Modification to tell us something about the situation between State
Street and Gaia House Mezz. Particularly, as noted by scholars of
Burke, the rhetor's language choices in the Third Modification act as "a
strategic response to a situation. 212 The rhetor attempts to structure the
reader's view of the situation between State Street and Gaia House
Mezz in a certain way, based upon her particular language choices.
It is important to note that the attorney is certainly cognizant of the
parties' difficult relationship during the drafting of the Third
Modification, as State Street had entered into a previous modification to
the Mezzanine Loan Agreement only eight months prior, based on Gaia
House Mezz's failures to perform. In looking at how the rhetor
composes the Third Modification, and the story it tells, the pentadic
elements can be identified and paired to determine which element
dominates. This dominant element provides insights into the rhetor's
motive in drafting the Third Modification the way she did. As noted by
scholars of Burke, rhetors will feature one of the pentadic elements
"when they express their thoughts. 213
Before determining which of the pentadic elements is featured, it is
helpful to understand how the pentadic elements have been set. Here,
the rhetor, as an attorney, represents State Street, and therefore frames
this party as the protagonist or agent in the pentad created by the Third
Modification. The rhetor notes that State Street is the "holder" of the
debt, and that Gaia House Mezz has "failed to comply" with the loan
documents in the past.214 This clearly sets State Street as the pentadic
agent, choosing to act in a particular way vis-A-vis the Mezzanine Loan
Agreement.
The way the rhetor "present[s] ... the major action taken" in the
transaction functions as the act in the pentad.1 5 Here, the document
grants Gaia House Mezz additional opportunities to successfully
perform in State Street's favor. This willingness to amend is the act
212. Bernard L. Brock, Rhetorical Criticism: A Burkeian Approach Revisited, in
METHODS OF RHETORICAL CRITICISM: A TWENTIETH CENTURY PERSPECTIVE, supra note 172,
at 183.
213. Id. at 188.
214. Joint Appendix Volume VI of VIII at JA-1229, Gaia House Mezz LLC, 720 F.3d
84(2013).
215. FOSS, supra note 181, at 358.
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undertaken by State Street, and it is clear that State Street is
purposefully undertaking this act because the rhetor is careful
throughout the document to acknowledge Gaia House Mezz's previous
defaults.21 6 Based on mentions of these defaults, the rhetor implies that
State Street could simply call the loan into default, but has graciously
chosen to act to amend the documents with the hopes of a positive
outcome.
Next, "the kind of stage the rhetor sets' 217 or scene, which serves
as the backdrop for the Third Modification, is one of difficulty and
economic hardship, based upon the state of the real estate market as
well as the parties' own dealings. The rhetor makes clear that the parties
were operating in a difficult financial relationship by mentioning the
previous modifications made to the Mezzanine Loan Documents due to
Gaia House Mezz's failures to perform.218
The final two pentadic elements are closely related. Purpose, from
a Burkean perspective, encompasses what "the agent intends to
accomplish by performing the act" and agency the "means... to
accomplishing [it]." 219 Since the agent intended to amend the
Mezzanine Loan Agreement to permit Gaia House Mezz additional
opportunities to perform favorably by extending various deadlines, the
agency for doing so must necessarily have been to revise the terms of
the Mezzanine Loan Agreement. In addition to these revised terms, the
rhetor included a traditional time is of the essence clause, as part of the
agency for requiring that the revised deadlines would be enforced
strictly. These clauses, including the time is of the essence clause,
served as the agency to accomplish the purpose of extending the time
for performance.
The strictest potential outcome related to breaches of the revised
deadlines would arise if the breaches were considered material. To
induce a material breach would have required any well-versed attorney
to include a time is of the essence concept in the document.220 In this
case, the rhetor chose to incorporate the time is of the essence concept
through the use of a traditional term of art construction, rather than a
plain English style. The attorney's motivation for drafting the Third
Modification in this way, and the related rhetorical and philosophical
justifications, will be determined by applying Burkean analysis to pair
216. Joint Appendix Volume VI of VIII, supra note 214, at JA-1238-40.
217. Foss, supra note 181, at 358.
218. Joint Appendix Volume VI of VIII, supra note 214, at JA-1228.
219. Foss, supra note 181, at 358.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 125-126.
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the five pentadic elements and determine which term dominates.
Application of the ratios of the pentadic terms suggests that the
dominant term in this pentad is the act of amending the Mezzanine
Loan Agreement to give Gaia House Mezz the opportunity to
successfully perform in State Street's favor. The dominant term in any
pentad necessarily "influences or requires" the rest of the terms of the
pentad to exist as proposed by the rhetor. Stated another way, a specific
pentadic term "typif[ies] th[e] discourse. "221
The rhetor's presentation of the act as State Street's amendment on
favorable terms dominates the pentad because it influences both the
purpose and the agency, as presented by the rhetor-attorney. The act of
amending the document in State Street's favor, when considering the
scene of chronic late performance, necessarily required the use of an
agency that employed language choices most likely to be beneficially
interpreted by end-users, particularly the judiciary. As rhetorical
scholars have noted, language choices in contracts are attempts to
"communicate information in a way that is recognized by the intended
audience and to effectuate a specific purpose that audience
acknowledges. 222 Therefore, the act of favorable amendment required
the use of a traditional term of art.
B. Outcomes of Rhetorical Analysis
The application of Burke's pentad to the Third Modification in
Gaia House shows that the dominant feature was the act of State
Street's favorable amendment to the Mezzanine Loan Agreement. The
success of this act necessarily required that the rhetor, in telling State
Street's story through the Third Modification, serve as an advocate for
State Street's interests through her language choices. This motivation
necessarily compelled the attorney to include language responsive to the
circumstances presented by the client in connection with the transaction.
In this case, Gaia House Mezz had breached the extended April 15,
2010 deadline to obtain the TCO in the very recent past when State
Street's attorney began drafting the Third Modification, executed on
May 9, 20 10.223
Based on the backdrop provided by this scene, the act of favorably
amending the Mezzanine Loan Agreement through the Third
Modification necessarily required the rhetor to use language choices
22 1. Brock, supra note 212, at 188.
222. Davis, supra note 178, at 669.
223. Gaia House Mezz LLC v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 720 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir.
2013).
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that would cause breaches of deadlines to have severe consequences.
This determination of the client's interests, and response in the
document with language which would advance them, required the
drafter to specifically state that failure to timely perform would be
considered a material breach. Based on the status of the law in the
Second Circuit, the required agency for doing so required the use of a
traditional term of art.224
Further, the position and perspective of the client became the
primary motivating features in the decision of which type of language to
include in the document to achieve the purpose of extending Gaia
House Mezz's deadlines in a way that would still favor State Street. As
an advocate, the rhetor would certainly be expected to become familiar
with the most effective means of achieving the desired outcome for the
client in the jurisdiction in which she operates.
In this case, based on well-established Second Circuit precedent,
the inclusion of a traditional, broadly constructed time is of the essence
clause was likely determined to be the most effective way to advance
the client's interest as presented to the eventual end-user of the
document, the judge. This recognition of audience in the dominant act is
supported by Dickerson's early work on drafting style, prior to the dawn
of the plain language movement, which recognized that the judiciary
serves as an important audience for a drafter's work.225
The recognition of client advocacy as the primary motivating
feature in this drafter's choice to use the traditional construction of a
term of art disproves Torbert and Adams' theories that retaining terms
of art is a passive exercise, which awaits judicial interpretation rather
than seeking to avoid litigation.226 In this instance, the choice to include
a traditional term of art acts as a means of asserting a client's position
and could ideally avoid litigation if the potential implications of judicial
interpretation of the term are presented to an opposing party at the pre-
litigation stage.
Thus, the drafting attorney's recognition that the court's eventual
interpretation of the clause would be highly beneficial for her client
motivates the inclusion of the traditional clause as a means of
224. By way of example, the time is of the essence clause is so strictly enforced in the
Second Circuit that lower courts in the jurisdiction have gone so far as to imply the
existence of such a clause where none is even explicitly included in the document being
litigated. See generally Cliffstar Corp. v. Alpine Foods, LLC, No. 09-CV-00690(A)(M),
2012 WL 7828966 (W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 22-34.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
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strengthening a client's position.227 This theory is supported by
Foucault's notion that courts and commentators assist in setting the
boundaries of meaning of heavily interpreted terms228
The determination that an act of advocacy motivated a rhetor in a
pentad concerning the preparation of a legal document, even a contract,
should not be surprising, as advocacy necessarily underpins rhetorical
choices made by an attorney. According to legal rhetoric scholar Linda
Berger:
[T]he outcome of a legal argument is inherently rhetorical. That is, it
is rhetorical because any agreement with the conclusion rests upon the
ability of one proponent to persuade another, or to persuade an
authoritative decision maker, to read a document or to understand a
situation in a certain way.
229
Additionally, the focus on advocacy as a motivating factor behind
maintaining traditional terms of art finds support in Gulati and Scott's
study of the pari passu clause.230 Specifically, Gulati and Scott's theory
that the reduction of risk is a primary. basis for the "stickiness" of
traditional terms23 1 implies that an attorney seeking to avoid potential
unfavorable judicial outcomes would advocate most effectively for a
client by including a tested term which is likely to be interpreted by a
judge in a client's favor. This choice to advocate through the use of
tested terms is also strengthened by the fact that it "enlist[s] the
attendant authority of the law"232 through relying on favorably
interpreted terms.
Further support for successful advocacy toward a judicial audience
as a primary motive for retaining traditional terms of art can be found
by considering the controlling philosophical influence underpinning a
pentad focused on act. According to Burke's writings, where "act is
featured in the pentad... the corresponding philosophy is realism." 233
The philosophy of legal realism, based on the writings of Karl
Llewellyn, has been described as including a focus on "how judges
[have] decided cases," noting that decisions offer "critical insight into
227. See Gaia House Mezz LLC, 720 F.3d at 95 (noting that "[n]either Gaia House nor
the court may re-write the contract," thus implying that State Street, the only other party
involved, likely wrote it).
228. See FOUCAULT, supra note 96, at 211.
229. Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching "Law as Rhetoric": A Place to Stand,
16 J. LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 11 (2010) (emphasis added).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 79-92.
231. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 10, at 35.
232. Kastner, supra note 79, at 6.
233. Foss, supra note 181, at 363.
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legal practice." 234 Thus, Llewellyn's legal realism supports the notion
that "the meaning of a legal rule is known only in its use.
235
Therefore, the advocacy-focused motivation of a drafter correctly
bears in mind the potential of judicial interpretation, in a legally realistic
manner. With regard to the application of realism, Burke himself notes
that "judges talk the same language" which, over time, causes "our very
notions of reality [to be] affected. 2 3 6 Therefore, the realistic drafter of a
contract would necessarily be attentive to judicial interpretations and
construct its contract to make beneficial use of these interpretations in
the client's favor.
The outcome of this pentadic analysis directly contradicts the
assertion that utilizing terms of art based on an appreciation for the
perspective of the judicial reader is "wrongheaded, ' 237 as well as
theories that "fatal weaknesses" exist in relying on judicial
interpretations to motivate retention of terms of art.238 Rather, the
dominant motive of effective advocacy when including a traditional
term of art necessarily requires a realistic understanding of the judiciary
as audience for the term used.
Therefore, based on this Burkean analysis, the drafter's choice to
retain a traditional term of art is strongly motivated by the desire to
obtain the most favorable result for a client in a particular transaction.
This focus on positive results necessarily requires a consideration of the
judge as a potential end-user of the document, in the same way a brief-
drafter would focus on the judiciary as the audience. The dominance of
act in this pentad, highlighting advocacy as the drafter's primary
motive, provides an opportunity for recommendations to practitioners
and drafting scholars in how to approach the question of whether and
when traditional terms of art should be retained.
C. Recommendations for Practitioners and Scholars
In light of a potential motivation to retain traditional terms of art
based on advocacy, scholars of contract drafting style must adjust the
ways in which they discuss the intersection of style and substance.
Particularly, scholars must take care when approaching the issue of
whether to lump terms of art in with meaningless "legalese" which is
appropriate fodder for redrafting into plain English.
234. Francis J. Mootz III, Introduction to ON PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW, at xiv
(Francis J. Mootz III ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2009).
235. Id.
236. BURKE, GRAMMAR, supra note 12, at 174.
237. GARNER, PLAIN LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 109.
238. ADAMS, MANUAL OF STYLE, supra note 2, §§ 1.30-.36
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As demonstrated by the foregoing Burkean analysis, drafters who
retain terms of art phrased in the traditional manner have rhetorical and
philosophical motivations for doing so, based on their desires to
advocate for their clients, protect their clients' interests, and speak the
language of the jurists who may potentially interpret the language used.
Therefore, it becomes clear that transactional attorneys must not be so
quick to rephrase time-tested terms of art into plain language. Rather,
drafters must undertake three important steps of analysis before altering
a traditional term of art.
First, in order to avoid the pitfall of "unintended consequences"
which Adams associates with "top-heavy" terms of art239 a drafter must
fully research the judicial interpretations of each term of art included in
a particular contract in the controlling jurisdiction. A second and related
step requires the drafter to determine the appropriate phrasing of the
term, as preferred by the judiciary in the controlling jurisdiction. These
steps effectively combat Adams' critique of "top-heavy" terms of art as
often being drafted incorrectly.240
Each of the foregoing determinations requires that the drafter
perform deep research into the case law of the controlling jurisdiction in
order to determine the significance placed upon such terms by the
particular judiciary which may eventually become a secondary audience
to the contract, as well as the preferred method of construction of the
term. This research into the interpretations of the term made by judges
in the particular jurisdiction may provide the drafter with guidance
concerning proper and preferred formulations of the particular term of
art. For example, a drafter may discover that broad constructions of the
term are not favored and thus, choose to redraft the term in a more
narrow way.
Finally, and most importantly, a drafter must consider the client's
particular position within the proposed transaction and whether the
inclusion of a particular traditional term of art could have potential
benefit. The drafter must act as an advocate for the client in the subject
transaction. Just as the drafter of a brief would strive to phrase her legal
arguments most persuasively to the identified judicial audience, a
drafter must carefully consider whether the traditional construction of a
term of art would be the most effective means of communicating within
the particular discourse community that may eventually interpret the
contract.
239. Id. § 1.21.
240. Id. § 13.691.
[Vol. 65:451
Say the Magic Word
This step requires a deep understanding of the client's desired
outcomes, as well as the existing course of dealing between the parties
involved in the transaction. The role of the drafter when considering
language choices in a contract must then necessarily go beyond that of a
scrivener to become a true business counselor.241 Only upon taking on
this role can the language choices of the drafter be fully informed and
appropriately motivated. Encouraging drafters and students of drafting
to become cognizant of business issues and mores is thus critical in
ensuring that the drafter will effectively and accurately use traditional
terms of art when beneficial to the client.242
By way of example, as demonstrated in the Gaia House case,243
lenders' attorneys would be wise to retain a traditionally-constructed
time is of the essence clause related to borrower performance covenants,
particularly due to the history of failure to timely perform. The focus on
the potential benefit to the client of retaining the term of art, and
potential risk associated with an unfamiliar phrasing, should be more
heavily stressed when making the determination of whether to rephrase
a term of art. This consideration goes beyond a mere reliance on the
language being time-tested by the court to determine if the most
frequent outcomes in litigation over such terms of art potentially benefit
the client.
CONCLUSION
The plain language movement has done much to encourage
drafters to modernize, clarify and reduce needless ambiguity in their
drafting. Many suggestions made by modem scholars of drafting style
concerning the removal of needless "legalese" have streamlined contract
prose and permitted clients to more fully understand the documents
being drafted on their behalf. However, where the redrafting of a
traditional term of art, a phrase that stands as heavily-interpreted legal
shorthand for a particular concept, would potentially undermine an
attorney's efforts to most effectively advocate for his or her client's
desired outcomes in a transaction, the traditional term of art should be
241. See STARK, supra note 61, at 369, stating that "[s]ophisticated drafting requires a
lawyer to understand the transaction from a client's business perspective and to add value to
the deal."
242. See generally Illig, supra note 72 ("Although the typical law school curriculum
places an appropriately heavy emphasis on theory and doctrine, the importance of a solid
grounding in context should not be underestimated. The best business lawyers provide not
only legal analysis and deal execution. We offer wisdom and counsel.").
243. See generally Gaia House Mezz LLC v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 720 F.3d 84,
95 (2d Cir. 2013).
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retained.
These terms of art exist as more than needlessly convoluted jargon
meant to elevate legal discourse beyond the comprehension of the
layman. Rather, they serve as a means of lending credibility and
persuading audiences within an established discourse community. As
noted by Burke himself,
The magical decree is implicit in all language.., an attempt to
eliminate magic, in this sense, would involve us in the elimination of
vocabulary itself as a way of sizing up reality. Rather, what [drafters]
need is correct magic, magic whose decrees about the naming of real
situations is the closest possible approximation to the situation
named.244
As advocates, drafters must always strive to use this "correct
magic" on their clients' behalf.
244. BuRKE, LITERARY FoRM, supra note 184, at 4.
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